United Nations S/2008/804

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 December 2008

Original: English

Letter dated 19 December 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my report of 17 November 2008 (S/2008/709) on Somalia, in which I undertook to revert to the Security Council with further proposals and alternative options in the event that the multinational force envisaged in the Council's presidential statement of 4 September 2008 (S/PRST/2008/33) did not materialize.

As I advised the Council during its meeting on 16 December 2008, only 14 of the 50 countries approached have responded to my request for contributions to a multinational force. One country has offered to provide funding, equipment and logistical support, while a second has offered funding. Two international organizations also expressed willingness to facilitate contributions from their members. However, no Member State has yet pledged troops or offered to assume the lead nation role.

Although I have yet to receive formal responses from the remaining 36 Member States, it is my assessment that sufficient troop pledges to allow the deployment of a multinational force are unlikely to materialize. I regret this disappointing outcome, which stands in such sharp contrast to the exceptional political will and commitment of military assets which Member States have shown in respect of the fight against piracy. It remains my advice that the complex security challenges in Somalia cannot be addressed within the capabilities of a typical United Nations peacekeeping force and that a multinational force is the right tool for stabilizing Mogadishu.

While I will continue to approach States that have not yet responded to my appeal for contributions to a multinational force, and would request your continued assistance in identifying a possible lead nation, I would like to present to the Council the attached proposals on alternative options (see annex). These options could be taken together as a package of steps that would be undertaken immediately to support implementation of the Djibouti peace process and contribute to enabling the conditions required for the eventual deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

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Annex

Somalia: next steps for the military/peacekeeping track

Note by the Secretary-General dated 17 December 2008

Background

1. In its presidential statement of 4 September (PRST/2008/33), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to identify and approach States that might contribute the required financial resources, personnel, equipment and services for a multinational force for Somalia. To date, the Secretariat has received formal responses from 14 out of the 50 countries approached. One Member State has offered to provide airlift services, logistical support, equipment and funding for a multinational force, while a second has offered to contribute funding. Two international organizations have expressed willingness to help by mobilizing funding from their member states. No Member State has offered to play the lead nation role. It is our assessment that Member States will pledge some resources and possibly troops, but not enough to allow the deployment of a multinational force. Nonetheless, efforts are continuing to obtain pledges from the 36 Member States that have yet to respond to the appeal for capabilities for a multinational force.

2. Ethiopia has announced that it will withdraw its forces from Somalia at the end of 2008. A number of Member States, as well as the Chairman of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, have expressed their concern about the impact of Ethiopia's withdrawal on the situation in Somalia. In a meeting of the International Contact Group for Somalia on 16 December, Ramtame Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union (AU), noted the political commitment of the latter to keeping the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) in place after the departure of the Ethiopian forces, noting that this would be possible only if the mission received the international assistance necessary to enable it to reinforce and sustain its operations.

Next steps and options

3. In the absence of adequate pledges for a multinational force, there are a number of options that should be considered in order to put in place the necessary security arrangements to support the Djibouti peace process. Those options could be implemented simultaneously and would pave the way for the eventual deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, subject to progress in the political process and an improvement in the security situation on the ground, in keeping with Security Council resolution 1814 (2008).

4. The steps which should begin immediately would include: (a) to request AU to maintain AMISOM troops on the ground after the Ethiopian forces withdraw, coupled with substantial, credible and immediate measures to reinforce the mission; (b) to provide training, with international partners, for the joint police and military forces of the Transitional Federal Government/Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) established by the Djibouti process and to build the capacity of rule of law and security institutions in Somalia; (c) to explore the possibility of establishing a maritime task force, or of adding to the current anti-piracy operations a quick-reaction component that would have the capability of launching operations into Somalia for specific tasks, including providing support to the peace-process-

related missions or the presence of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), providing support to AMISOM operations and working with AMISOM and the joint Somali forces to create conditions that would pave the way for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation; and (d) to continue preparations for the eventual deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the appropriate time and under the right conditions.

(a) Reinforcing AMISOM

5. AMISOM will be crucial in filling the security vacuum that may be created by Ethiopia's withdrawal. Resources must be provided to allow AMISOM to be reinforced and to achieve its originally intended troop strength (8,000) and to enhance its capability to protect itself as well as key installations, such as the airport, seaport and strategic areas that will be vacated by the Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu. Support to AMISOM should be provided not only by the Secretariat, but also by Member States. AU also envisages early deployment of police advisers who could provide training, monitoring and mentoring to Somali police in-country, where security permits, and has expressed willingness to consider a training role in respect of the Transitional Federal Government-ARS Transitional Security Forces, should this be requested. AMISOM does not have the mandate or capabilities to assume a peace enforcement role.

6. The Secretariat is working with the African Union to determine the resources needed to reinforce AMISOM. It is understood that bilateral partners of AU have already agreed to assist AMISOM troop contributors, Burundi and Uganda, by providing the necessary contingent-owned equipment for the additional battalions to be deployed. However AMISOM also requires significant support at the mission level in the area of logistical, medical and engineering capabilities.

7. The Secretariat is working with AU to develop a prioritized list of requirements, covering both immediate and medium-term needs. As a concrete step, and subject to approval by the relevant legislative bodies, the Secretariat has developed a proposal for the immediate in-kind enhancement of AMISOM through the transfer of approximately $7 million worth of assets following the liquidation of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The transfer would include assets essential to the ability of AMISOM to support additional troops, including prefabricated accommodation, electricity generators, air-conditioning units, ablution units and soft-skin vehicles. This first package should be supplemented by a more sustainable package of United Nations support to be mandated by the Security Council. The Secretariat is also exploring, in consultation with Member States and the Controller, creative ways of mobilizing assured funding for AMISOM.

8. It is recommended that the United Nations take the following urgent and specific steps to facilitate continued and reinforced presence of AMISOM in Somalia:

(a) Request AU to maintain AMISOM troops in Somalia after the departure of the Ethiopian forces and offer the assistance indicated below in order to support the reinforcement of the Mission;

(b) Member States that have pledged funding or equipment for a multinational force should be requested to redirect those contributions to AMISOM;

(c) A joint effort between the Secretariat and Member States to support AMISOM is required. The Security Council could request the Secretariat to develop and deliver a logistics support package for AMISOM, which would include equipment and services normally provided to peacekeeping missions under the heading of United Nations-owned equipment. The package could cover accommodation, rations, water, fuel, armoured vehicles, helicopters, vehicle maintenance, communications, some enhancement of key logistics facilities, medical treatment and evacuation services. It would aim to provide mission support services to AMISOM with a view to raising basic operational standards;

(d) The Secretariat should continue to support AU planning and deployment preparations through its Planners team in Addis Ababa, with a view to facilitating the build-up of AMISOM over a 6 to 12 month period; in this regard, to continue to provide expertise and guidance to AMISOM to facilitate deployment of its envisaged police component as security conditions permit. United Nations planners should work with AMISOM and the Somali parties to develop a programme for the selection, training, capacity-building and professional development of the Somali Police Force. The role and activities of AMISOM should be developed in line with the Djibouti process and in close coordination with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and bilateral partners to avoid duplication and ensure coherence.

(b) Building Somali capacity

9. The United Nations should build the capacity of the Djibouti signatories to restore the security sector and the rule of law. One approach would be for the United Nations to assist the parties in developing and coordinating a coherent package of training for the joint Transitional Federal Government-ARS forces, as well as for justice and corrections personnel. Other international partners would also help to train and equip the Transitional Security Forces (initially 5,000 joint Transitional Federal Government-ARS forces) as well as the Somali Police Force (10,000 civilian police), justice and corrections personnel, and other key areas identified by the parties. They would be trained in conjunction with UNDP and Member States.

10. Given the current insecurity in Somalia, some of the necessary training would be provided outside the country, under arrangements similar to the UNDP-sponsored programme for the training of Somali police trainers. (For example, it is reported that some Member States have indicated readiness to provide training for 8,000 to 10,000 Somali police personnel.) To enable the coordination of such assistance, the Council could decide to expand UNPOS with a significant new advisory unit that would include expertise in police and military training and planning for future security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, as well as a rule of law and corrections component. Together, those personnel would provide expert advice and assist in planning short- and long-term international support to Somalia's security and rule of law sectors. Capacity-building programmes should begin at the earliest opportunity, with an early focus on training of trainers outside the country and, as soon as security conditions permit, delivery of "quick win" projects in Somalia itself. Programming across the security, police, corrections, and demining sectors should take a national approach, be coordinated with wider early recovery goals and focus on strategic issues, particularly the reintegration of ex-combatants.

11. To ensure coherence between out-of-country and in-country training and mentoring, a partnership should be forged among the Somali parties, the United Nations (led by UNPOS on the ground), AMISOM and other international partners who may be involved in the programme. As indicated in paragraph 9 above, AMISOM intends to deploy police advisers and trainers as part of its reinforcement. One approach would be to include in the reinforced AMISOM a component responsible for security sector reform and training, with UNPOS providing coordination and management of a robust trust fund, UNDP and bilateral actors providing complementary training and assistance, and Somalia providing the police and military components (along the model of the DIS in Chad). Across all sectors, programming should be nationally owned, closely coordinated with existing United Nations activities and build on the gains of activities previously undertaken by UNDP and the United Nations Children's Fund, among others.

12. Beyond the security sector, the international community should also significantly increase its support to strengthen and build the capacity of government at the federal, state and local levels with agreed performance indicators and accountability criteria. A number of United Nations initiatives currently undertaken through UNDP could be scaled up. The focus should be on institutional development, human resource development, strengthening of planning, budgeting, public finance management and public accountability processes and support to service delivery.

(c) Maritime task force

13. Concomitantly with the above steps, the Security Council should consider the possibility of establishing a maritime task force, or requesting Member States who are currently participating in the anti-piracy operations of the Somali coast to include in their operations a component that would have the capacity to support AMISOM operations, UNPOS peace process efforts and the United Nations presence in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia.

14. Planners in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are developing a concept of operations for a small multinational maritime force, which could be either independent or part of the current anti-piracy operations, and which would be based off the coast of Somalia within an accessible distance of Mogadishu. The multinational maritime force could host a quick-reaction force that would support AMISOM forces at the request of the AU Force Commander and could support UNPOS peace-process-related missions in Somalia. It could be equipped to launch operations into Mogadishu and other areas, as well as to provide emergency medical or other evacuation support to AMISOM.

15. If a separate and independent multinational maritime force is established, its mandate and tasks would be coordinated with other maritime operations currently involved in anti-piracy tasks and in escorting WFP shipping. This option would have the advantage of harnessing Member States' willingness to commit robust naval assets to address threats arising on land. It could provide an important signal of the Council's commitment to putting in place security arrangements to support the peace process, a boost to the peace process, and an operational platform for the launch of an eventual United Nations peacekeeping operation.

(d) Contingency planning for a United Nations peacekeeping operation

16. It is envisaged that the above steps would help create a force on the ground that could become part of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The contingency planning for such a peacekeeping operation is ongoing and will be continuously updated to take account of the needs and priorities emerging from the Djibouti peace process and to ensure that a viable concept of operations is in place at the appropriate time.

17. We believe that taken together, the above steps provide the basis for a strategic approach to strengthening the forces for peace in Somalia. Such an approach would complement the measures already taken by the Council to contain the conflict. At the same time, none of these measures is a substitute for political progress, which must go hand-in-hand with security measures.